SK Teleco BLOCKED BY THE FCC

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-422345A1.pdf

On June 12, 2026, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ordered the removal of the Montana-based SK Teleco, LLC from the Robocall Mitigation Database and effectively cut them off from all American communications networks for their continued facilitation of Social Security scams, where

  • The scammers will send fraudulent robocalls falsely claiming there was a “pre-authorized” order for a PlayStation 5 and Pulse 3D headset from Walmart, urging the recipient to press 1 and be transferred to a “live operator.”
  • The “live operator” will then pose as a federal agent and phish for personally-identifiable information about their victim, including their full SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.

The company was among 37 to be warned by the 51 Attorneys General that compose the Anti-Robocall Multistate Litigation Task Force on August 7, 2025 and was later given a proper cease-and-desist by the FCC on December 2, 2025.

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Why does it always seem it’s the minor players who get a slap on the wrist?

There much bigger fish to fry. But at least they did something for a change

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Yeah, I’ll take any victory, even a minor one at this point.

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Sometimes you need to cut off some of the branches before you fell the tree. I hope that is the case here.

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Nice small start. If they keep blocking others that would be a great event.

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Because the minor players are the problem. Everyone must understand, telecoms like Sinch and Bandwidth are one big umbrella. They don’t facilitate the calls, nor are they the ones selling the numbers to scammers. The small time players are the ones selling these numbers to scammers, while being a network on Sinch and Bandwidth (A wholesaler). This is what the Demurrage group refers to as a “Mark”

The wholesalers are the problem, as in the smaller players. They are the ones who sell numbers to scammers in order to bypass KYC. So while a number may come back as Onvoy or as Bandwidth, they aren’t actually numbers on those telecoms. Other companies like RingCentral also get their residential numbers from Sinch, and they will appear as “Onvoy” on public look ups, even though the number belongs to RingCentral. Same with MS Teams. They also come back as “Onvoy” RingCentral also get their residential numbers from Lumen and Bandwidth, and they will appear as such when looked, so while many scambaiters are complaining about Sinch and Bandwidth, they fail to understand that those numbers aren’t actually theirs. They belong to someone else, which is why it appears as if these companies don’t do anything, other than forwarding the report to their “customer”, which is the “mark” I.E., the smaller player.

This is the problem we’re facing now. Small time marks, the actual wholesalers, selling pre-made and pre-verified accounts to scammers, bypassing KYC. I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again, this is the largest scambaiting forum on the web. You all need to get with the times and forget about what you think you know about these scammers. They have people on the inside. They own telecoms. These are not the dumb people this forum likes to claim that they are. Since 2022, scammers are now alleged to own 4 telecoms that are solely used to sell toll free numbers to scammers overseas. Since 2023, they have infiltrated the rest of the telecom world as “wholesalers” and have defeated KYC. You must all get with the times.

This is a victory because it shows that marks can be touched.

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I think you’re identifying a real problem, but I disagree with the conclusion that the large carriers are largely irrelevant.

The small wholesalers absolutely deserve scrutiny if they’re knowingly selling numbers, pre-verified accounts, or services that allow scammers to bypass KYC. Nobody should get a free pass. But telecom accountability shouldn’t stop there.

The reality is that scammers require an entire ecosystem to operate. A small wholesaler may be the entity directly onboarding the scammer, but they are only able to function because larger carriers provide the numbering resources, interconnection, and network access that make those calls possible. If a major provider repeatedly finds that significant scam traffic is flowing through a customer, there should be an expectation of meaningful oversight and enforcement. (There often isn’t)

We don’t generally accept the argument that “I only supplied the infrastructure” in other industries. Banks are expected to monitor for money laundering. Payment processors are expected to monitor fraud. If a carrier is repeatedly hosting downstream providers that generate enormous volumes of illegal robocalls, regulators are justified in asking whether adequate monitoring, auditing, and enforcement are taking place.

I also think it’s important not to overstate the distinction between “the number belongs to Onvoy/Bandwidth” and “the number belongs to a downstream customer.” The public doesn’t care about telecom routing hierarchies. What matters is whether the industry is exercising reasonable diligence throughout the chain. If a scam call ultimately traverses multiple providers, every provider that profits from that traffic has some responsibility to prevent abuse.

So yes, go after the bad wholesalers. Absolutely. But focusing exclusively on the smallest players risks creating a game of regulatory whack-a-mole. Shut down one wholesaler and another appears tomorrow. Lasting change requires pressure at every level of the supply chain, including the companies with the resources, visibility, and leverage to cut off abusive actors at scale.

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@MajorLeeAwesome - I wholeheartedly agree with all your points and would go a step further.

Too many wholesale voice and messaging providers - whether companies such as Sinch/Inteliquent, Infobip/Peerless, Fractel, or others - hide behind the claim that they are merely wholesalers and therefore do not know who the ultimate sender or caller is. In practice, however, they often have far more visibility and control than they admit (e.g. average call velocities and their origin). They can investigate suspicious traffic patterns, respond to credible complaints, demand information from resellers, and disconnect customers or downstream providers engaged in illegal activity.

The problem is that taking action can mean LOSING REVENUE. As a result, there is often little incentive to aggressively police bad actors unless regulators force the issue.

There should be clear legal liability when a carrier or wholesale provider willfully ignores repeated, credible complaints about illegal robocalls, scam calls, or fraudulent text campaigns. If a provider knowingly turns a blind eye to abuse, fails to conduct reasonable investigations, or continues carrying traffic after being put on notice, victims should have the right to seek civil remedies. Accountability should not stop with the scammer if intermediaries are knowingly enabling the activity. I definitely know multiple attorneys who would love to sue these nasty beasts.

A “we’re just a wholesale carrier” defense should not shield companies that possess both the ability and the information necessary to stop obvious abuse but choose not to act.

@T-Rex @barryspar @FrankWest @Jhawk @Mike1212

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The key issue is not whether a wholesale carrier knows the identity of every end user at all times. The real question is what happens after the provider has been put on notice. Once a carrier receives repeated, credible complaints that a customer, reseller, or traffic source is engaged in illegal robocalling or scam messaging, continuing to carry that traffic without a meaningful investigation should be viewed as willful blindness rather than mere ignorance.

Carriers should also be required to maintain complaint records and document how they respond. If a provider receives dozens or hundreds of complaints regarding the same traffic source and cannot demonstrate that it investigated those complaints, regulators should be entitled to draw adverse inferences from that failure.

There should also be a private right of action against carriers and intermediaries that knowingly or recklessly facilitate illegal robocalls and scam texts. Victims should not be limited to pursuing the often-unidentifiable scammer. When a provider has the ability to investigate, suspend, or disconnect abusive customers and chooses not to act despite repeated warnings, it should share responsibility for the resulting harm.

In fact, I am advocating for criminal liability for the executives and owners of carriers turning a blind eye to illicit traffic.

Too often the explanation is that a provider is “just a wholesale carrier.” Yet these same providers have the ability to terminate customers, disconnect resellers, impose compliance requirements, and monitor traffic patterns when they choose to do so. The reality is that aggressive enforcement may and will likely reduce revenue, creating a financial incentive to tolerate questionable traffic longer than they should.

Regulators should distinguish between providers that actively investigate complaints and providers that ignore them. Companies that promptly investigate and shut down abusive traffic should receive protection, while those that repeatedly disregard credible evidence of illegal activity should face escalating penalties and increased liability.

My own experience reinforced these concerns. After repeatedly reporting what I believed to be unlawful traffic, I was met with hostility rather than engagement from a legal team of one wholesale carrier. Whether or not a complaint ultimately proves correct, providers should be expected to investigate concerns in good faith instead of dismissing or discouraging those who report potential abuse. In fact, I was even mocked and ridiculed. Public trust depends on transparency, accountability, and meaningful oversight rather than intimidation.

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I am completely disgusted by the intransigence of carriers. We’re at a point where even your own carrier who you pay money to, will not disclose who carried traffic to your own phone, unless you get a subpoena.

They really don’t give a :poop:

I get a dozen calls a day from Pakistan because I pissed some of these call centers off. I’m talking about thousands of calls. Nobody will lift a finger to deal with it.

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Same here! Hundreds of calls from Pakistani, Indian and Filipino scammers and spammers. And let’s address elephant in the room: What EXACT business do these callers have contacting an average US person, for example? Has anyone ever asked the question as to why exactly is it so easy for foreing malevolent actors to obtain US phone numbers to harass the general public? I most definitely wouldn’t shed a single tear if NO foreign-based individuals could establish a VOIP carrier here or use their overseas carriers to call me. After all, no decent foreign-based persons would even have a reason to call the US public. Yes, American scammers exist, but they are a bit easier to catch for LEOs. We need to treat telephone network as strategic infrastructure, instead of scammers’ playground and toy.

And let’s be honest: India, Pakistan and the Phillipines and their corrupt officials generate considerable revenue from scams. It is a well-established and lucrative industry there.

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Here is one lovely notice: https://ncdoj.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/State-AG-Task-Force-NOTICE-Letter-to-INTELIQUENT-Issued-12-03-2025.pdf

@JonW

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Trucking companies can’t simply shrug and say, “We only transported the cargo” if they’re knowingly moving contraband.

Landlords can face consequences if they allow their properties to be used for criminal activities.

Online marketplaces are expected to remove counterfeit goods and fraudulent sellers when they become aware of them.

The principle is the same: if your business provides infrastructure that is being repeatedly used for criminal activity, society (and the law) generally expects you to take reasonable steps to detect it, prevent it, and stop profiting from it.

We don’t let banks ignore money laundering, FedEx ignore drug shipments, casinos ignore laundering, or landlords ignore illegal activity in rental properties. ‘I only provided the platform’ has never been a particularly persuasive defense when the abuse is obvious and ongoing.

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Exactly! By the bizarre logic used by some telecom players, we might as well all become money mules and runners for cartels, international spy networks, Triads and Eastern European mob… I can only imagine the reactions of FBI agents, Homeland Security operatives and federal prosecutors, if the offenders were to tell them: “Well, it was just money/documents/substances in these packages. I was just driving them to various destinations across the country, getting phone calls and helping out my handlers. I am just trying to make some money here. You can’t hold me accountable for that!” :grin: :laughing: :laughing:

No, I say, certain telcos ARE and will ALWAYS remain one of the root causes of the issue! It’s time that we hold them accountable. Other core contributors to this serious issue are: Weak politicians and lazy and incompetent prosecutors and regulators. We, the society, should make it extremely difficult, costly and troublesome for said telcos to enable scammers and harassment of our people.

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One of the biggest failures of the modern Western democratic system is the complete lack of accountability and the weak, painfully slow response to industrial-scale telecom fraud and abuse. Everybody talks, everybody holds hearings, everybody issues statements — meanwhile ordinary people are being robbed, harassed, manipulated, and financially destroyed every single day.

There are several dimensions to this problem:

  1. We must start aggressively holding VOIP carriers and telecom intermediaries accountable. Far too many of these companies hide behind the absurdly convenient defense of “we didn’t know” or “we’re just a wholesale provider.” That excuse stops being believable when the same providers repeatedly route obvious scam traffic, illegal robocalls, spoofed numbers, fraudulent SMS campaigns, and other criminal garbage year after year while collecting enormous profits from it.

At some point, “we didn’t know” becomes willful blindness.

These companies should be getting buried under lawsuits, regulatory penalties, and government enforcement actions the moment it becomes clear they knowingly ignored abuse patterns. Right now, the incentives are backwards: there is enormous money to be made facilitating this activity, while the consequences are minimal. I’d also love to see the private right of legal action against VOIP SCUM to have class action lawsuits filed against them. Imagine how much money we can generate too!

  1. We also need to stop pretending that foreign actors are not a central part of this problem. A massive percentage of illegal robocalls, spam texts, scam operations, fraudulent support centers, and abusive offshore harassment campaigns originate from countries such as India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and several others.

Not every call center operation is technically a scam, but many US and EU companies intentionally outsource aggressive and legally questionable operations overseas specifically to shield themselves from liability and public scrutiny. Everybody knows this is happening.

And because these industries generate huge amounts of money locally, there is often little motivation for foreign governments or law enforcement agencies to seriously crack down on them. The West needs to start making this economically and diplomatically painful through sanctions, trade pressure, visa restrictions, financial targeting, and much more aggressive international enforcement cooperation. Again, there are 3 key culprit nations mentioned above. Once you take care of that challenge, the problem will likely diminish.

  1. We are also failing to hold our own institutions accountable. Congress, the FBI, DHS, the FTC, the FCC, and countless regulators spend years fighting political turf wars, issuing reports, and conducting endless bureaucratic theater while ordinary people — especially the elderly and vulnerable — get financially gutted by bottom-feeding scum operating at industrial scale.

The criminals understand something our governments still do not: if enforcement is slow, fragmented, weak, and politically distracted, then crime becomes a business model.

Right now, telecom fraud is one of the safest and most profitable criminal enterprises on Earth. That is an indictment of the system itself.

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Also, I love these ideas and suggestions shared by the reputable organization below. They openly admit that our current legal framework is not properly set-up to hold VOIP carriers accountable:

If some of you have solid evidence to share regarding questionable conduct by several VOIP carriers, it may be a good idea to share it with NCLC. They have some lobbyists and attorneys in DC.

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The wholesalers are the problem, as in the smaller players. They are the ones who sell numbers to scammers in order to bypass KYC

You make an interesting point that I wasn’t aware of friend. I appreciate the info but I also agree with scamterminator 2021 in that ALL people must be held accountable across the board.

Hey all, slightly off-topic, but I have a very interesting situation that’s somewhat related to scamming telephones and law enforcement.

Someone in my community was scammed by a con man who convinced the victim to deposit money into a fake investment site, which was really just stealing Bitcoin via a Bitcoin ATM. It pretended that the investment was appreciating in value until the victim tried to withdraw it, and then it said, “You need to send more money to unlock the money.” When the victim sent that, it just locked up.

However, the one ray of hope here is that the scammer actually is still active and in the same state as the victim. This apparently is an inexperienced scammer or mule who’s using a regular phone line and WhatsApp on that phone line. The method this scammer was using to find victims was a dating site, and he would initiate relationships before scamming the money.

I sent him a Grabify link from a burner number and got his approximate location and IP address. When he realized what had happened, he got a little berserk and contacted some of his former victims, offering to send back some of the money. I know that I touched a nerve with him.

Unfortunately, he never really ended up returning the money once he realized that we weren’t coming to pound on his door at 3:00 in the morning.

Law enforcement is somewhat involved to the extent that there is a detective on the case who actually understands blockchain and looked into some of this here and there. What I’m not managing to understand is why they wouldn’t be able to get a subpoena against the carrier, because I’m pretty sure this person is using a regular postpaid line tied to a real identity. It’s possible the detective just isn’t sufficiently invested in this, but for the victim, it’s their life savings, and I really want to help them.

Does anyone have any leads on inducing law enforcement to pull the records on a phone line? Would filing a civil suit and asking the judge for a court order to subpoena the records be helpful? Similarly, the IP address seems to be a residential cable line, which really should yield some results.

I just need to figure out how to get someone with both of the investigative authority and the will to care about it.